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In September, I was privileged to 
be one of a very few card-carrying 
scientists at an event grandly called 
the “Calgary Summit of Philosophers 
of Science: Future Approaches for 
Philosophy of Biology.” Grand it was, 
with many of the field’s luminaries in 
attendance to discuss the condition 
of the discipline. Some thought 
this to be precarious. Philosophy 
departments (in the US at least) often 
regard the subject as problematically 
impure — dangerously close to the 
actual science. Biologists, on the other 
hand, may think it too far removed, not 
infrequently harbouring the opinion, 
famously that of Richard Feynman, that 
“philosophy of science is as useful to 
scientists as ornithology is to birds.” 
We know what we know, and too much 
attention to conceptual frameworks 
and terminological precision just leads 
to ‘analysis paralysis’. 
Both views are misguided, as Peter 
Godfrey-Smith’s refreshingly short 
(187 pages) new book, Philosophy 
of Biology, and recent brouhahas in 
genomic biology make abundantly 
clear. Biology is beset with deep 
conceptual puzzles, and biologists do 
need to take them seriously, even — or 
especially — when they admit to no 
clearly best solution.
Concerning the brouhahas, that over 
ENCODE two years ago comes first 
to mind. Claiming to have driven the 
final nail in the coffin of ‘junk DNA’, 
the proponents of this richly-funded 
megaproject then did not (and still 
only grudgingly) acknowledge that the 
fraction of the human or any genome 
regarded as functional depends on 
what one means by ‘function’, and that 
this is not a given. In other vigorous 
debates of particular personal interest, 
such as those concerning the ‘Tree 
of Life’ or ‘species’, there are also no 
facts of the matter. Everything depends 
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semantic: but not merely so. Unpacking 
words and concepts is essential to 
understanding the natural phenomena 
to which they are meant to refer. 
As to Godfrey-Smith’s little book, 
it provides an authoritative but easy 
starting place for readers of Current 
Biology who want to root out tacit 
philosophical commitments in their 
disciplines, and/or appreciate how 
thinking more deeply about how we 
think about what we do would benefit 
us all as scientists. Written for both 
“philosophy students and biologists 
interested in philosophical issues 
surrounding their work”, all but the first 
of its nine chapters explore currently 
active areas in philosophy of biology, 
most of which relate to types of active 
empirical research embraced by this 
journal. 
The first chapter succinctly recounts 
the history of biology, reminding us 
of the integrative power of the theory 
of evolution, especially as it has 
expanded to more enthusiastically 
embrace molecular and developmental 
biology and eliminate the last traces of 
teleological and vitalist thinking. The 
next chapter goes on to address ‘laws’, 
which biology is often disparaged (vis-
à-vis physics) for lacking. “So what?” is 
one rejoinder: the astounding success 
of 20th century biology indicates that 
we are doing something right. But 
Godfrey-Smith digs deeper into the 
distinction between necessarily true 
but abstract conditional statements 
(the laws of physics or the principle 
of natural selection), and historically 
contingent (‘accidental’) exception-
prone regularities (for instance 
Mendel’s so-called laws or molecular 
biology’s ‘Central Dogma’). That 
distinction may be one of degree not 
kind, and some regularities may be 
both — Mendel’s laws are necessary 
for organisms with the reproductive 
machinery of contemporary sexual 
eukaryotes, but there did not have 
to be such organisms. And if one 
believes — as some do — that 
our universe and its mix of laws 
and constants are also contingent, 
comprising only one of many possible 
or actual realities, biology is not so 
different from physics after all. 
Perhaps to avoid such metatheory, 
many biologists deal in ‘mechanisms’ 
or ‘models’, the differences between 
which Godfrey-Smith parses delicately. 
It is the pursuit of such explanatory schemes, even if they are not laws, 
that makes biology more than simple 
‘stamp collecting’.
The next chapter, on natural 
selection, might best be read after 
the author’s justly popular 2009 book 
Darwinian Populations and Natural 
Selection. The latter freed many of 
us from the need to shoehorn every 
situation in which we are sure in our 
hearts that selection must be at play 
into rigid (for instance, replicator–
interactor) formal models. Godfrey-
Smith in this new book highlights 
other issues, such as whether or not 
selection can be ‘creative’ (it can), 
and how best to formulate a ‘universal 
Darwinism’ (undogmatically but in 
a principled fashion). Practicing 
biologists may be surprised that there 
is still debate about what kind of a 
force, principle or process ‘natural 
selection’ actually is, on what sort of 
entities it might act and the meaning 
of ‘fitness’. We readily invoke, but 
often cannot easily explicate, these 
concepts. Godfrey-Smith explains 
why.
Chapter Four, “Adaptation, 
Construction and Function”, should 
be assigned reading for the ENCODE 
team. Surely the attitudinal divide 
between ‘adaptationists’, who think 
of organisms and their genomes as 
exquisitely tuned machines, and those 
of us who see biological systems as 
barely able to cope with their own 
ineradicable noisiness is one of the 
deepest in the discipline. ‘Empirical 
adaptationism’ as defined by Godfrey-
Smith seems to be ENCODE’s default 
mode, and may explain its conflation 
of the different meanings of ‘function’, 
which Godfrey-Smith succinctly 
compares and contrasts in the 
broader context. Perhaps there is no 
single true definition, but inferences 
embracing one cannot be used to 
refute claims based on another, which 
is what happened in the junk DNA 
debates of 2013. 
In just six pages Godfrey-Smith 
deftly traces two millennia of ideas 
about function and their imperfect 
mappings one to another. Of course, 
since Darwin frank purposiveness has 
been replaced by evolutionary ‘just so 
stories’ (teleology by teleonomy), but 
there remains a mysterious backward-
looking character to both. In fact, 
adaptation is “a kind of feedback 
process, operating over a long time 
scale.” Such processes were coming 
into intellectual focus in the 19th 
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drew a connection to selection. 
Individuality, the subject of the 
following chapter, is a key issue in 
contemporary ‘microbiomics’. The 
belief that we and our microbiota 
comprise holobionts with shared 
evolutionary trajectories underlies 
the popular distinction between 
‘dysbiosis’ (as in inflammatory bowel 
disease) and ‘eubiosis’ (good gut 
health), at least connotatively. Godfrey-
Smith does not address this hot 
new science directly, but provides 
a framework with which to do so. 
In his previous book, he introduced 
very useful three-dimensional cube 
diagrams, with axes corresponding to 
various tuneable (coming in degrees) 
biological parameters. For reproductive
individuality of collective entities (made 
up of lower-level reproducers), these 
parameters could be bottlenecking 
(periodic reduction to a few individuals 
or cells), germ/soma separation 
and integration. By their positions 
in the cubical space so defined we 
can distinguish tightly conforming 
‘paradigm cases’ of reproductive 
individuals on which selection can 
obviously act (such as fruit flies or 
humans, with high values in all three 
axes) from more complex potential 
‘collective reproducers’, such as aspen 
groves, slime molds, or buffalo herds. 
To the extent that selection can act 
on any population of such entities, the 
latter are ‘Darwinian individuals’. Not 
all are also ‘organisms’ according to 
Godfrey-Smith (viruses and memes 
aren’t, for instance) nor, conversely, are 
all organisms necessarily Darwinian 
individuals. If we define organisms 
metabolically or physiologically, as 
“systems comprising diverse parts 
that work together”, then holobionts 
such as bobtail squid (which must 
acquire fresh vibrios as luminescent 
symbionts from the ocean each 
generation), humans together with their 
gut microbes, and even Gaia might 
be such. But none of these would be 
Darwinian individuals, reproducing as 
units or comprising unitary targets on 
which selection might act. Darwinian 
individuality and organismality are 
tightly coupled in most organisms 
chosen by biochemists and geneticists 
as models; indeed, one might argue 
that the choices were made on that 
basis. Much of the living world is not 
like that.
Chapter Six is about “Genes”. 
Thankfully Godfrey-Smith does not  
get bogged down in the definitional 
problematics (What are the boundaries 
of genes? Do untranscribed 
regulatory regions count?) that often 
seem to trouble philosophers more 
than biologists. He does tackle 
another hoary issue which can 
still put geneticists at loggerheads 
with developmental biologists and 
humanists: to what extent do genes 
cause phenotype? Causation is 
not as simple as many biologists 
might naively think: is it a defective 
phenyalanine hydroxylase, that amino 
acid itself, the enzymes that convert it 
to phenylpyruvate, or for that matter 
the ribosomes that make the enzymes, 
that causes phenylketonuria? More 
contentiously, is religiosity caused by 
some ‘God gene’? Much of the rhetoric 
indulged in by genomicists gives 
causal primacy to genes and much 
of the pushback (often from social 
scientists) privileges epigenetics and 
environmentally-driven developmental 
systems, broadly defined. 
Godfrey-Smith wants to avoid what 
many of us have settled for in order to 
get past these recurring nature-nurture 
debates — ‘bland interactionism’. By 
this he means “a view saying merely 
that every feature of every organism is 
due both to its genes and environment 
and there is no way to distinguish their 
importance” (p. 86). There is a way he 
argues, and that is through focusing 
on difference making (being sufficient 
for an effect) and specificity (variation 
in the effect matching that in the 
cause). Whether DNA comes out on top 
causally in the everyday biology of cells 
depends on the circumstances and 
scale of the analysis, though “at least 
one significant difference between 
genetic and non-genetic causes is 
that a gene can have an effect on 
phenotype that explains why the gene 
is there — why it has been selected 
for” (p. 91).
As to the evolutionary centrality 
of individual genes Godfrey-Smith 
demurs, seeing such models as 
tracking “just a few features of a 
complex set of processes.” This seems 
to be partly (and regrettably, in my view) 
because he buys into ENCODE’s claim 
that pretty much all of our genome (and 
presumably of the much larger ones 
of lungfish and lilies) has some subtle 
regulatory function. Although indeed, 
as he notes, “Genomes are more 
organized objects, and their partition 
into genes more artificial, than the 
classic models suppose” (p. 98), the magnitude of each ‘more’ remains hotly 
contested. Philosophy and science 
must work together on this. 
The chapter on “Species and 
the Tree of Life” reminds us that 
‘typological thinking’ (or essentialism) 
has not been eradicated from 
systematics, or at least from some 
of the ways in which it is practiced 
and promoted. A widely-publicized 
paper three years ago asserted that 
there are “~8.7 million (±1.3 million 
SE) eukaryotic species globally”, 
reinforcing the notion that species are 
countable things, but proposing no 
definition of what was being counted. 
Godfrey-Smith rings the changes on 
popular species definitions, none 
universally applicable, and then 
expresses sympathy with the very 
sensible position “that ‘species-talk’ 
can be useful in biology even though 
species are not real units in the natural 
world” (p. 107). Useful, yes, but how do 
we count the unreal?
A deeper question, surely 
philosophical enough to satisfy the 
purest metaphysician, is what sorts 
of things species, if they were real 
units of the natural world, might be. 
Godfrey-Smith considers sets, sums 
and properties (intrinsic or extrinsic) 
as possibilities and seems to settle on 
a robustly practical pluralist species 
ontology: “Different kinds of structure 
in the world make different grouping 
criteria useful, and different grouping 
criteria often work naturally with one 
ontological framework or another” 
(p. 113). One would presumably not 
have such a deep exegesis on unicorns 
or snarks, so maybe there are some 
ways that ‘species’ engage reality. But 
anyone who thinks she knows there is 
only one true way, and that she knows 
what that is, should read this chapter. 
In the end, Godfrey-Smith notes that 
different species notions apply in 
different parts of the Tree of Life, itself 
possibly a metaphor (not a discovery) 
that may in future come to be seen as 
“a rough representation that has been 
superseded by something else”. He 
concludes that “There is no point in 
trying to legislate about the use of the 
word [“species”]. A term surrounded 
by a long history of debate and diverse 
applications, as “species” is, will take 
its own undirected evolutionary path” 
(p. 119).
Chapter Eight, about “Evolution 
and Social Behavior”, is my favorite. 
Godfrey-Smith’s treatment of 
group selection, kin selection and 
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in explicating these processes as 
they might foster altruism (defined 
nonpsychologically, as net reproductive 
sacrifice). He appears to endorse the 
common belief that selection between 
groups for altruism is a weak force 
because it “seems likely to be a slow 
process, while the subversion of groups 
from within seems likely to be a fast 
one” (p. 121). True, but if group benefit 
is conferred as a pleiotropic effect of 
an individually beneficial trait, such 
selection could be very strong. And 
one of the scenarios Godfrey-Smith 
entertains for an easily demonstrated 
‘basic human prosociality’ (an evolved 
altruistic bias) indeed is multilevel. 
His exploration of the possibilities in 
this very active area of psychosocial 
research and evolutionary speculation 
is refreshingly noncommittal. Similarly 
his treatment of meme theory and 
cultural evolution, which allows that 
under some conditions ideas can be 
‘Darwinian individuals’. Under other 
conditions what happens is more like 
learning, in which, though “adaptation 
can arise by retention and refinement 
of useful variants, this is not in general 
because these variants make more of 
themselves” (p. 138).
Most brilliant is how Godfrey-Smith 
handles ‘human nature’, which many 
of my politically liberal humanist 
colleagues vehemently dismiss as a 
pernicious myth. But of course there is 
such a thing — even liberal humanists 
have different expectations for their 
children than their dogs! Godfrey-
Smith writes: “Homo sapiens is an 
easily recognized species, and once 
you know that someone is a human 
you can make predictions about him 
or her. The observable features are 
caused in large part by a genetic 
profile that is common across humans. 
If you want to know why humans look 
so unlike chimps and sturgeons, DNA 
is not the whole story but it is the most 
important difference maker” (p. 139, 
harkening back to Chapter Six). But he 
goes on to insist that we are not stuck 
with the nature we have: “As evolution 
is open-ended, this talk about our 
nature has a post hoc character. A 
new characteristic that is ‘abnormal’ 
now might be the basis for a new 
nature in the future. That much is true 
of all species, not just humans.” (p. 
142). This balanced and hopeful view 
Godfrey-Smith aligns with those of 20th 
Century existentialists, like Jean-Paul 
Sartre.The last, and perhaps the most 
‘ornithological’, chapter is on 
“Information”. One knee-jerk reaction 
is to think we know what this is: what 
else could it be that is transcribed 
into RNA and translated (like a poem) 
into protein if not information? But 
the idea is riddled with contradiction. 
We can describe in exquisite detail 
just how a particular gene produces a 
particular protein without ever using 
the I-word. Of course how and why 
a gene makes a protein is recorded 
in its structure. But similarly a tree’s 
age and climatic experience is 
recorded in its pattern of rings, and 
a geological formation’s history is 
recorded in its strata. Godfrey-Smith 
concludes that “evolution is not an 
information-using or information-
involving process in a way that 
marks it off from other processes of 
change” (p. 152). Instead, he prefers 
communication as a unifying concept 
for biology, quite unlike standard 
accounts of information or coding. 
“Communication-like behaviors are 
ubiquitous, and communication is also 
a manifestation of something more 
basic. A combination of receptivity 
and activity, with those behaviors 
stabilized by selection, by feedback, 
is a distinctive feature of the living 
world” (p. 156).
The philosophy and practices 
of biology connect more or less 
strongly in the various chapters of 
this book. Although doubtless too 
much attention paid to the meaning of 
words would slow progress, too little 
promotes fruitless debates and opens 
windows for hype — encouraging 
the public (and our funders) to 
believe that results mean more or 
other than they do. Some areas of 
research importantly engage social 
issues (genetic determinism, human 
empathy, species conservation) and 
to pretend that there are only facts at 
play is disingenuous. In others it may 
be that all we birds might gain from 
ornithology is a deeper understanding 
of ourselves. This book touches 
all these bases, and although it is 
too brief to be the only text for any 
course, it would be a perfect addition 
to or foundation for the reading list for 
many. And no practicing biologist who 
reads it is likely to think her time was 
wasted.
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What turned you on to science — 
and vision science in particular — in 
the first place? The earliest relevant 
memory I have is learning about the 
accomplishments of Albert Einstein; 
he passed away when I was three 
years old, but I do recall telling my 
friends at a young age that I was 
going to be a scientist like Einstein, 
so I must have heard about him and 
his accomplishments, likely from 
my parents, and was inspired. The 
space race of the 1960s was also a 
major inspiration, and I went through 
most of my younger years alternating 
between wanting to be a physicist, an 
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